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INDIAN CONTROL FOR
QUALITY INDIAN EDUCATION
MICHAEL PAUL GROSS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Indian education, a national tragedy according to the Special
Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education,1 cannot be improved on
a massive scale until two conditions are met: development of a
sound legal theory to support the right of Indians to control their
children's education; and creation of a system to provide respon-
sive assistance to Indians to put that right into effect.
Such is the judgment of Indians, educators, politicans, and law-
yers who have worked in Indian education and who have concluded
that the prerequisite for better Indian education is basic structural
reform designed to put Indian education back under Indian control.
Until Indians acquire that automatic right to meaningful involve-
ment in bringing up their children and until that right is vindicated
through local Indian initiative, aided and abetted by competent
legal assistance, the millions now spent on school programs for In-
dians are likely to remain as unproductive, indeed destructive, as
in the past. In the words of the 1969 report by the Special Sub-
committee on Indian Education: "American Indians have little, if
any, influence or control in the education of their children in pub-
lic schools [where two thirds of them are enrolled]; 1 2 "Indian
parents and communities have practically no control over the BIA
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1. SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON IN-
DIAN EDUCATION. INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S.
R P. N . 501, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., (1969) [hereinafter referred to as S. REP. N. 501].
2. Id. at 52.
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schools educating their children [where most of the other one
third are enrolled];" 8
The Report recommends: "That Indian boards of education be
established at the local level for Federal Indian school districts;
. . . that Indian parental and community involvement be increas-
ed;" 4 and "that State and local communities should facilitate and
encourage Indian community and parental involvement in the de-
velopment and operation of public education programs for Indian
children."' 5
The contention which composes the thesis of this article-the
need for Indian educational self-determination-represents a contro-
versial and timely topic in view of the appearance of a recent Stanford
Law Review article by Daniel M. Rosenfelt of the Center for Law
and Education, Harvard University. That article was produced un-
der a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Center
and the Native American Rights Fund of Boulder Colorado for
legal assistance in education to Indians. 6
Mr. Rosenfelt's article is a thorough, well-written account of
the legal history of Indian education from its earliest white in-
fluences to the present exciting innovations in local control at Rough
Rock, Arizona; Ramah, New Mexico; Wind River, Wyoming; Bus-
by, Montana; Rocky Boy, Montana, and other places. However, Mr.
Rosenfelt errs when he states that:
Although a state may establish public school districts co-
terminus with an Indian reservation, it does not follow that
states must do so. Just as there is no federal constitutional
right to "white" education, there is no constitutional right
to an Indian education. 7
This assessment is imprecise and misleading for it represents a
conclusion based upon concepts derived from stringent legal analysis
rather than from a more single-minded representation of Indian
rights.
II. THE LEGAL. ARGUMENTS FOR INDIAN CONTROL
In order to establish a foundation for a positive legal position to
bolster the Indian education movement, it is first necessary to demon-
3. Id. at 101.
4. Id. at 119.
5. Id. at 135.
6. The article will be published in the second issue of the Stanford Law Review in
the spring of 1973. Comments about it here are based on a draft provided to the author
by Mr. Rosenfelt in September, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Rosenfelt]. The author and
the editors of the North Dakota Law Review have been assured by the editors of the
Stanford Law Review that no major revisions on the points discussed here will be made
in the published version.
7. Id.
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strate the existence of infinitely stronger legal arguments concerning
the right of Indians to control their own schools than those put for-
ward by Mr. Rosenfelt. To aid this analysis attention will be focused
on one typical Indian community situation, in order to develop
theories under which states are not simply permitted but required to
create Indian-controlled school districts.
The Wind River Reservation, home of the Eastern Shoshones
and Northern Arapahoes, is the only Indian reservation in Wyoming.
It has a population of about 5,000, a low standard of living, health
problems, unemployment problems and educational problems. The
reservation was created in 1868 by a Treaty with the United States.
Until the 1950's education remained the concern only of missionaries
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). But in the Eisenhower
era, the Johnson O'Malley Act of 1934,8 interpreted through the
eyes of terminationists then in power, became the vehicle for the
wholesale transfer of Indian education from federal hands to the
states. At Wind River the single BIA school at Fort Washakie was
closed, as, coincidentally, were two mission high schools-one for
lack of funds, the other because of a disastrous fire. 9
By agreement with the BIA, but without any meaningful con-
sultation with the Indians or their knowing consent, the State of
Wyoming extended its jurisdiction to the reservation,0 creating
three elementary school districts and extending a high school dis-
trict to the reservation from an off-reservation city, Lander.
Since then most Wind River students have been educated in
public schools, although a considerable number of high school stu-
dents continue to enroll in off-reservation BIA boarding schools."'
During the school year 1970-71, an average of 120 Indian high
school students were enrolled at such institutions located in Utah,
South Dakota, Oklahoma and elsewhere. They represented about
one quarter of the secondary school aged children on the reservation."2
Wind River differs in one respect from many other Indian com-
munities. Creation of the elementary school districts on the reser-
vation, where the majority of the people are Indian, has provided an
8. Johnson-O'Malley Act., Act of Apr. 16, 1934, oh. 147, 48 Stat. 596, as amended, 25
U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1970).
9. Interviews with Mrs. Alberta Friday, teacher at the Mill Croek Elementary School,
District 88, and member of the Fort Washakie Elementary School District, No. 21: Mr.
Allison Sage, Sr., President, Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc.; and Father
David Duncombe, Episcopal Mission, Ethete, Wyoming, conducted from September 1970
thru January 1973 [hereinafter referred to as Interviews].
10. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) Permits the Secretary of Interior to allow states to extend
their jurisdiction to enforce state school laws to Indian reservations with the consent of
tribal governments.
11. 25 C.F.R. § 31.1(a) (Supp. 1972).
12. Statistics from the Assistant Agency Superintendent for Education, Wind River
Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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opportunity for Indians to achieve control of the three public elemen-
tary schools operated by the districts. All three have been controlled
by elected school boards with Indian majorities for several years. To
a significant degree, Indian control of these schools is generally
recognized as accounting for the wide-spread community support
which exists for them and for the absence of many of the problems
found in non-Indian controlled elementary schools.18
However high school education has, if anything, deteriorated.
All students above the elementary level must leave the reservation
to obtain a high school education. Those in federal boarding schools
are totally segregated-enrollments in boarding schools are virtually
100 per cent Indian.14 Those in Lander Valley High School and
Riverton High School-the two largest off-reservation public high
schools to which Indian students go-are predominantly Anglo: 82
per cent at Lander and 95 per cent at Riverton (the latter has
a small Mexican-American enrollment as well).15
In addition to Indians in school, there are those not in school-
the dropouts, or as Indians prefer to call them, pushouts. Statistics
on them are very uncertain. They are often invisible. If a child
does not enroll anywhere at the beginning of the year, he may not
show up on anyone's tabulation. Current estimates of the dropout
rate in Freemont County, site of the Wind River Reservation, vary
from 25 to 40 per cent, 6 although the real figure may be much
higher due to the statistical uncertainties.
Educationally the high school programs open to Indians from
the reservation are disastrous, especially in the public schools.
From interviews with parents and administrators17 the picture
which emerges corresponds in every way with the tragedy describ-
ed by the Senate Subcommittee's Report.
Very few Indians graduate from high school. Those who do
graduate rarely go on to college. Curricula in the public high
schools are not geared to Indian needs and wishes. There are few,
if any, Indian teachers and no administrators. There is no effec-
tive Indian representation on the boards which control the high
schools. Further, adequate representation for Indians cannot be
achieved even if Indians were to vote in a bloc since they are
far outnumbered in the high school districts, where elections are held
13. Interviews, supra note 9.
14. 1971 BIA, ANN. RIE. ON STATISTICS CONCERNING INDIAN EDUCATION.
15. 1970 ANN. REP. OF Wyo. STATE PLAN FOR JEOHNSON-OWALLEY FUNDS.
16. Id.
17. Including Silas Lyman, Superintendent, Mill Cree Elementary School District No.
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on an "at large" basis. Subtle forms of discrimination against In-
dians abound in one of the off-reservation high schools, which has
the largest Indian enrollment, and is present to a considerable de-
gree in other schools. On numerous occasions Indian parents have
tried to get relief from school authorities, without success. (At
least once, reservation parents were not even permitted to speak
before one of the high school boards about the problems.)18 Accord-
ing to Mr. Lyman, the superintendent of the Mill Creek Elementary
School District (controlled by an Indian-majority board), the really
unfortunate thing is that the Indian children are happy, eager and
responsive until they graduate from elementary school and enter
the high schools. The troubles begin there. The Indians rebel. They
dropout. They refuse to study.
As a result of this crisis, Indian parents were forced to search
for other means to remedy what they consider to be a worsening
situation. They focused on the Wyoming School Code of 1969 and
its chapter on School District Reorganization.19 This law mandates
statewide school district consolidation. Seeking a chance for mean-
ingful structural reform, Wind River parents felt that if a unified
(kindergarten through grade twelve) district were created on the
reservation, they would be able to maintain control of the three
elementary schools and extend their control to a reservation high
school. If, on the other hand, consolidation ignored the reservation
entity and the wishes of its inhabitants, then Indian control of the
elementary schools would be lost and elementary education would
likely deteriorate to the level of secondary education. As a result
the Wind River parents have, since 1969, worked to demonstrate
community support for a reservation unified school district.2 1
The Wind River situation is not unique. The Senate Subcommit-
tee's Report demonstrates this. Commenting on public schools for
Indians, the Report says:
At the heart of the matter, educationally at least, is the re-
lationship between the Indian community and the public
school and the general powerlessness the Indian feels in re-
gard to the education of his children. . . . 'This relation-
ship frequently demeans Indians, destroys their self-respect
18. Interviews, supra note 9.
19. Chapter 6, §§ 21.1-105 et seq., Wyo. Stat. (1957).
20. This effort has produced referenda in each of the 3 elementary school districts
showing a two to one majority in favor of the plan; a petition of support signed by over
900 people, the most ever to sign a petition In the history of the reservation; a resolu-
tion of support from the Arapahoe Business Council; and creation of a private, commu-
nity-run high school at Ethete, Wyoming, the Wind River Indian High School, financed
by the BIA to serve as a nucleus for an eventual reservation public high school. The
school has an enrollment of about 100, all former dropouts.
21. S. REP. N. 501, aupra note 1, at 24.
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and self-confidence, develops or encourages apathy and a
sense of alienation from the education process, and deprives
them of an opportunity to develop the ability and experience
to control their own affairs through participation in effec-
tive local government.'...21
The Subcommittee found this climate of disrespect and dis-
crimination common in off-reservation towns which educate
many Indian students in their public schools. 22
The Indian is despised, exploited, and discriminated against
• . . but always held in check by the white power structure
so that his situation will not change.2 3
Assessing the reasons for the abominable conditions, the Report
states:
I. The dominant policy of the Federal Government towards
the American Indian has been one of coercive assimilation.
A. The policy has resulted in the destruction and disor-
ganization of Indian communities and individuals.
B. A desperately severe and self-perpetuating cycle of pov-
erty for most Indians ...
III. The coercive assimilation policy has had disastrous
effects on the education of Indian children. It has resulted
in:
A. The classroom and the school becoming a kind of
battleground where the Indian child attempts to protect his
integrity and identity as an individual by defeating the pur-
poses of the school.
B. Schools which fail to understand or adapt to, and in
fact often denigrate, cultural differences. ...
D. Schools which fail to recognize the importance and val-
idity of the Indian community. ...
E. A dismal record of absenteeism, dropouts, negative self-
image, low achievement, and, ultimately, academic failure
for many Indian children. ...
IV. The coercive assimilation policy has two primary his-
torical roots:
A. A continuous desire to exploit, and expropriate, Indian
lands and physical resources.
B. A self-righteous intolerance of tribal communities and
cultural differences.24
From these comments and the circumstances at Wind River it
should be clear that unresponsive education for Indians is endemic
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21.
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in white-dominated school systems on or near Indian reservations.
The question is whether these inherent, historical infirmities are
open to other than a piece-meal legal challenge.
The above circumstances tend to outrage people of good will
and provide a mandate for Indians and non-Indians alike, neces-
sitating structural reforms such as those that the Wind River people
desire.
It is on this ground that Mr. Rosenfelt and I so strongly dif-
fer, for he still believes, it would seem, that Indians can work
within existing systems, while I do not. This difference also accounts
for our disagreement on the state of the law. For I maintain that
the United States Constitution, interpreted in light of these facts
and given the special status of Indians under federal law,25 gives
Indians a right to educate their children in schools that they con-
trol.
The problem, in terms of the Wind River situation, is whether the
State of Wyoming must reorganize school districts in Fremont County
in order to give Indians their own school district coterminus with
the reservation? The answer, I believe, is that they must.
1. EQUAL PROTECTION APPLIED
The heart of the outrage produced by the circumstances of In-
dian education is its fundamental unfairness. While everyone else
can choose his own life style, culture and beliefs, Indians are be-
ing singled out by the dominant non-Indian society for especially
brutal treatment designed to force them to accept middle-class
Anglo mores. It is this element of special, harmful treatment which
gives rise to two interrelated Equal Protection arguments to sup-
port the Wind River people's effort and the efforts of other Indians
to obtain and control their own school districts. First, the Equal
Protection Clause may arguably prohibit coercive assimilation
which can be shown to damage Indian children educationally and
emotionally. Secondly, the Equal Protection Clause (as well as the
Fifteenth Amendment) may further prohibit coercive assimilation
since it represents a denial to Indians of equal access to political
power.
The basis for these two arguments is summarized by the follow-
ing two questions:
1. What happens when integration produces unequal educa-
tional opportunity for a racial or ethnic minority?
25. See text infra accompanying notes 91-96. When speaking of Indians I mean those
Native Americans who live in geographically- and ethnically identifiable communities on
or near Indian reservations.
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2. What happens when integration produces unequal access
to the political process for a racial or ethnic minority?
To arrive at the conclusion in answer to both questions that
the United States Constitution requires structural reform to re-
turn control of schools to Indian parents and communities, it is
necessary to discuss coercive assimilation. This is a form of racial
discrimination that differs fundamentally from that practiced
against other racial minorities, notably blacks. The legal theories put
forward here depend on the realization that racial discrimination
in this country is multi-formed. While the dominant society may be
biased against all minorities, the means it uses to implement its
prejudices varies from group to group. These differences are cru-
cial to an analysis of the legal effect of coercive assimination for In-
dians because they relate to the fundamental conclusion that: The
remedies for eliminating discrimination against one minority may
be inappropriate, indeed harmful, to another.
The nature of the difference between discrimination as prac-
ticed against blacks and Indians is characterized by fundamentally
divergent influences. Where blacks have been forcibly excluded
(segregated) from white society by law, Indians-aboriginal
peoples with their own cultures, languages, religions and territories
-have been forcibly included (integrated) into that society by law.
That is what the subcommittee meant by coercive assimination-
the practice of compelling, through submersion, an ethnic, cultural
and linguistic minority to shed its uniqueness and identity and
mingle with the rest of society. It is the practice of forcing an
historically separate people into a melting pot which scalds rather
than warms; as compared with segregation-the practice of for-
cibly expelling a people from a society of which they wish to be a part.
(a) Educational Deprivations as Violations of The Equal Pro-
tection Clause-The Brown Case
The outstanding characteristic of schools for Indians under their
present administrative structure is the incredibly poor job they do
in educating Indians and the shocking rates of emotional disturb-
ance they cause among Indian children. Correspondingly, these same
schools do not excel in educating the non-Indian, but at least the
QUALITY INDIAN EDUCATION
bulk of the non-Indian students graduate and emerge without visible
harm from the public schools. This contrast poignantly illustrates
the basis of the Equal Protection argument advocating return of
control of Indian education to Indians. Support for this contention
inheres in the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation .28
Brown elucidates certain universal principles concerning appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment to racial discrimination. The
confusion concerning Brown's application to the Indian educational
situation stems from the fact that Brown involved a racial minority
suffering from a form of discrimination different from that applied
to Indians. The Brown Court came to its conclusions about the evil
of segregation in large measure because of a mass of social science
data submitted by the plaintiffs showing severe educational and
psychological damage to black children:
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.27
The Court went on to note that:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The im-
pact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as de-
noting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferior-
ity affects .the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.2 8
If it were shown that integration of Indian children in white-
dominated schools had the same negative educational and emotional
effects which segregation was held to have on blacks in Brown,
then a major basis for the Court's decision ordering an end
to state-imposed segregation would not apply to Indians. That such
is in fact the case is attested to by the Special Senate Subcommittee
whose chairmen-Robert Kennedy, Wayne Morse and Edward
Kennedy-were in the vanguard of Senatorial supporters of civil
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. Id. at 494.
28. Id. For a contemporary assessment of this finding in light of the current contro-
versy about the educational value of integration, see Hodgson, Do Sohaole Make A Dif-
terence? THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1973, at 35-46.
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rights. They nevertheless saw a distinction between the situation
of blacks, whose drive for integration they staunchly defended,
and Indians:
Ever since the policy of educating Indians in public schools
was adopted, it was assumed that the public schools, with
their integrated settings, were the best means of educating
Indians. The subcommittee's public school findings-high
dropout rates, low achievement levels, anti-Indian attitudes,
insensitive curriculums-raise serious doubts as to the val-
idity of that assumption. 29
However, focusing on the racial make-up of the classrooms in
which Indians are educated distorts the underlying policies man-
dating improved Indian education: It is not the physical presence
of whites in Indian classrooms that is educationally harmful;
rather, it is the administration of the school program which has
the damaging effect.
The plaintiffs' claims in Brown were aimed at laws forbidding
the mixing of children from different races in public schools-
the racial composition of the classroom-while the Indian educa-
tional question focuses upon control. This is a crucial distinction.
For it questions an aspect of Indian education not raised by blacks
in the integration cases-the powerlessness of Indians to influence
the educational process. It therefore differs fundamentally from
the core issues raised in Brown.
Actually, alteration of school district lines to give Indians con-
trol of their own schools will in most cases have little if any
appreciable effect on enrollments. (At Wind River, for example,
creation of a reservation unified school district would have no
effect on the racial composition of the elementary schools-they
would remain substantially Indian and would merely transfer
a portion of the Indians now in off-reservation public schools
with predominantly white enrollments to a reservation high school
which would be predominantly, though not entirely, Indian. The
off-reservation boarding school students, on the other hand, would
return to a high school at least partially integrated as compared
with the total segregation of the schools they now attend.)
So Brown, to the extent it dealt with a different racial minority
asking for relief from a discrimination not affecting Indians, is
not relevant. Yet of course, in its more universal aspects it serves
as a significant precedent for the proposition that states are under
29. S. REP. N. 501, supra note 1, at 31.
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an affirmative duty to place control of Indian education in Indian
hands.
The fundamental principles propounded in Brown and subsequent
cases are as follows:
1. State classification on the basis of race is inherently suspect;
2. Racial classification by a state becomes invidious when it
produces harm to the minority affected;
3. States are under an affirmative duty to end discrimination
on the basis of race;
4. When states refuse to act to meet their responsibility,
courts may fashion remedies suitable to removing the particular
form of discrimination present;
5. Discrimination by race is especially onerous in education
because of the importance of education today. ("Today, education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments.") 30
All of these elements are present at Wind River:
1. There has been state action-the creation of school district
lines;
2. State action results in classifying Indians in the same class
as everyone else when their needs, backgrounds and condition ob-
viously put them in a different situation;3 1
3. There has been enormous harm to Indian children resulting
from this racial classification;
4. The best remedy to correct the infirmities in public schools
educating Indians is to put them under Indian control;
5. The courts have power to fashion appropriate remedies in-
cluding the power to redraw school district lines to overcome the
effects of racial discrimination.3 2
Given the history of Indian education and the underlying bases
for the Brown decision, there is no reason _to question a state's
obligation to construct school districts or fashion other structures
placing actual control of education in the hands of Indians-
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See generally Kirp, Community
Control, Pblic Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1355 (1970).
31. See text infra accompanying notes 85-107 for discussion of the special status of
Indians.
32. Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'g
338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1973).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in order to promote the best interests of Indian children. There is
no case law directly in point on this matter-since the racial de-
segregation cases have all dealt with non-Indians. Yet their under-
lying principle-that racial classifications which are harmful to a
racial minority are illegal-applies here as well.
(b) The Deprivations of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
Political Rights-The Gomillion Case
I have chosen the Wind River situation as a focus for attention
because it so neatly poses a second basis for claiming that white-
dominated schools for Indians deny them Equal Protection of the
Laws and other analogous constitutional rights (a basis which is
present in most Indian communities but not in the same illustrative
fashion). This aspect concerns the existing Indian control of the
three elementary schools on the reservation. These schools are
Indian-controlled only because the districts in which they are located
are predominantly Indian. Indians have elected representative school
boards.
If Fremont County were to be reorganized without provision
for a unified reservation district, Indians would surely lose their
control of the elementary schools. Their votes would be diluted
in a sea of non-Indians who have demonstrated traditional hostility
towards them.
Such action by the State of Wyoming would offend the Fifteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as did the re-drawing
of the city boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, in Gomillion v. Light-
foot.38 From a position of political influence made possible by
the alignment of present political boundaries, the Indians-like the
blacks in Gomillion-would be removed from meaningful participa-
tion through the vote in the political process governing the educa-
tion of their children. Given the history of Anglo-Indian relations
in Fremont County, the absence of a compelling state interest
to ignore the reservation entity, 84 and the vigor with which Indians
have brought this issue to the attention of the state, a court could
only conclude that the state's motivation appears centered on the
deprivation of the political power of the Indians for discriminatory
reasons.
Gomillion involved Alabama legislative action redefining the
boundaries of Tuskegee. From a square, the legislature devised
33. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
34. See text infra accompanying notes 63-78. It is also significant that an ulterior mo-
tive for incorporating the reservation into white-dominated off-reservation districts
would be to gain access to the mineral wealth of the reservation and the fund of federal
assistance for Indians enrolled in public schools, see text infra accompanying notes 41-43.
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an "uncouth twenty-eight sided figure"8' 5 which effectively excluded
virtually all of the city's Negro voters. "The result of the Act is to
deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of
residents in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in
municipal elections." 88
While the Court recognized "the breadth and importance" of
the . . . "State's unrestricted power . . . to establish, destroy, or
reorganize by contraction or expansion its political subdivisions," 7
it reaffirmed that "such insulation is not carried over when state
power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally pro-
tected right."88
That was the Court's conclusion despite the absence of actual
proof, beyond the effects of the redistricting, of a specific intent
on the part of the Alabama Legislature to discriminate.
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted,
the conclusion would be irresistable, tantamount for all prac-
tical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the
legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and
colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as
to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.89
A similar result would occur here if the three elementary school
districts were included in a white-dominated district or districts,
unless meaningful provision were made for local control of schools
on the reservation by Indians (a practical impossibility under the
Wyoming School Code) 40 because such action could only lead to the
inference, as in Gomillion, that it was taken simply to deny Indians
their existing power to control the elementary schools attended by
their children.
The inference would be bolstered by these facts:
1. Coercive assimilation, with its characteristic deprivation to
Indians of influence in the educational process, is tremendously
harmful to Indian children;
2. The racial composition of the three reservation elementary
schools would remain unchanged, even if they were consolidated
into a large, white-controlled district;
3. The reservation's high tax base is coveted by off-reservation
35. Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
36. Id. at 341.
37. Id. at 342.
38. Id. at 347.
39. Id. at 341.
40. Chapter 6, §§ 21.1-105 et. seq., Wyo. Stat. (1957).
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non-Indians as is the federal money which attaches to each Indian
child enrolled in a public school through such laws as Public Law
874 (Impacted Area Funding), 4 1 Public Law 815 (school construc-
tion in impacted areas) ,42 Johnson O'Malley, and the various title
programs .4
4. Reservation inhabitants have indicated their desire to remain
politically distinct in education;
5. Indian children seeking a more integrated education could
easily be permitted to attend schools outside the reservation, if
they so desire, under provisions of the Wyoming School Code; 44
6. The Wyoming School Code provides for only at-large voting
for school trustees in reorganized districts, further diluting the polit-
ical strength of the minority Indian vote.4 5
If Fremont County were reorganized without regard for the
reservation entity, the resulting situation would be the mirror image
of Gomillion. In Gomillion, the racial discrimination, characteristic
of bias against blacks, was carried out by systematically excluding
Negroes from a political subdivision to deprive them of political
power. Here the same consequence would have been accomplished
by systematically including Indians in a political subdivision which
would be unrepresentative and therefore harmful to them. The two
analogous circumstances produce the same effect, and under the
reasoning of Gomillion:
It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudg-
ing a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of
the principles by which this Court must judge, and uniformly
has judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously defined, ob-
viously discriminate against colored citizens. 46
Discriminatory inclusion would also violate the Constitution. It
would make little sense to hold the Gomillion situation unconstitu-
tional and yet uphold the converse circumstance though equally
discriminatory. Both involve invidious, racially discriminatory state
action. It is a truism, moreover, to say that discrimination can
take various forms; that what is harmless to one person or group
may be disastrous to another. It is the effect of state action which
determines its constitutional validity. 7 So the mere fact that Wyo-
41. Pub. L. No. 874, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-241, 242-254 (1970).
4,2. Pub. L. No. 815, 20, U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1970).
43. Johnson-O'Malley Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596, a8 amended, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 542-54 (1970).
44. Chapter 4, §§ 21.1-67 et. seq., Wyo. Stat. (1957).
45. Chapter 6, § 21.1-125(a), Wyo. Stat. (1957).
46. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960).
47. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (19701) ; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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ming's school district reorganization applies to all citizens of the
state uniformly is of no special relevance. In fact it heightens
the suspicion that Indians' special needs and unique history are
being wilfully ignored.
Given the proper case, the Court would hold that a move
to deprive Indian people of control of schools, in light of the cir-
cumstances of Indian education, is an invidious discrimination and
must be enjoined. In Fortson v. Dorsey,4 a reapportionment case
in which certain multi-member voting districts in Georgia were
attacked as unconstitutional on their face, the Court reversed the
lower court's issuance of an injunction supporting the claim, stating:
[A]nd our opinion is not to be understood to say that in
all instances or under all circumstances such a system as
Georgia has will comport with the dictates of the Equal
Protection Clause. It might well be that, designedly or other-
wise, a multi-member constitutency apportionment scheme,
under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate
to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population. 49
But in the main the multi-member voting district cases must
be distinguished from the situation at issue. In Whitcomb v. Chavis,
for example, a state law (superseded by another which provided
for single-member districts)5 0 provided for apportionment of the
State of Indiana for its general assembly elections by creating
eight multi-member districts out of thirty-one senatorial dis-
tricts and twenty-five multi-member districts out of thirty-iiine
house districts. In that case, a group of inner city blacks from
a ghetto within Marion County challenged the constitutionality of
the multi-member district of which they were made a part, claiming
among other things that the statutes in question "invidiously diluted
the force and effect of the vote of Negroes and poor persons living
within . . . 'the ghetto area'. 51
In reversing a three-judge panel's decision agreeing with that
claim, the Court relied primarily on the factual situation actually
presented: "[T]he real-life impact of multi-member districts on
individual voting power has not been sufficiently demonstrated, 5 2
and the alleged effect of the inclusion of the ghetto in a larger,
multi-member district with a non-black majority could be said to
48. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 4,33 (1965).
49. Id. at 439.
50. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 128 n. 1 (1971); See aLso Owens v. School
Committee of Boston, 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969).
51. Id. at 128-129.
52. Id. at 146.
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deny blacks effective representation in the legislature only as a
result of losing partisan elections and not because of racial preju-
dice. 58
Here the facts are sufficiently different (at least partly be-
cause the minority community here is federally recognized and
protected) 54 to warrant the conclusion that the Gomillion reasoning,
which the Whitcomb Court explicitly approved, 55 would sustain an
injunction to prevent deliberate dilution of the Indians' voting
strength by inclusion in a predominantly white district.
The history of Indian-white relations nationally as well as in
Fremont County discloses that the accepted democratic theory which
justifies majority rule, and which is explicitly applied in Whitcomb,56
works to the inevitable disadvantage of Indians whenever they
are placed in political entities where they are in the minority. Demo-
cratic theory is based on the supposition that majority rule is justi-
fied because any minority has an equal chance with the majority
to gain political power through the process of political interchange
and persuasion. This seems to be the basis for the Whitcomb Court's
opinion which states that:
On the record before us plaintiffs' position comes to this:
That although they have equal opportunity to participate in
and influence the selection of candidates and legislators, and
although the ghetto votes predominantly Democratic and that
party slates candidates satisfactory to the ghetto, invidious
discrimination nevertheless results when the ghetto, along
with all other Democrats, suffers the disaster of losing too
many elections."
The conclusion reached by the Court in Whitcomb appears found-
ed upon circumstances not present in typical Fremont County situ-
ations. Indians do not have equal access with Anglos to political
power. Their numbers are too small, their interests too divergent
and the antagonism of whites toward them too great. Even when
Indians manage to elect a single representative on a board with
a non-Indian majority, such representation does not suffice to pro-
tect the interests of the Indian community. So one-sided is the rela-
tionship that the only effective remedy for protection of the group's
political rights is to acknowledge the inherent flaws in the demo-
cratic theories concerning majority rule and to allow Indians in
these cases to retain control within their own district.
53. See id.
54. See text iftfra accompanying notes 91-96.
55. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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There is no legitimate or overriding state interest which justi-
fies depriving Indians in Fremont County of their right to exercise
control over the education of their children. Hence, balancing58 the
interests of the state in consolidating the reservation with off-reser-
vation areas and the costs to Indian interests stemming from such
state action, a court should favor the Indians.
In addition to the implications of the Indians' relationship with
the federal government, which significantly strenthen their claim
for special treatment, it is not difficult to show that Wyoming's
interest in combining the Indian territory with off-reservation white
areas is insignificant when compared with the interest of Indians
in retaining control of their schools.
The Wyoming School Code's principal purpose is to create dis-
tricts which are "efficient administrative units" 59 and that have
"a ratio of average daily membership to assessed valuation as
nearly equalized as practicable among the unified districts in the
various counties." 60 Two points emanate from these purposes. First,
"efficient administrative units" is nowhere defined in the code.
If it relates to the goals of school consolidation nationally for eco-
nomic reasons as previous reorganizations under the code indicate,
then there is a serious question whether such a goal is educationally
defensible,(1 and whether it thus serves a legitimate state interest.
Moreover, would such a purpose-to save money-be sufficient
to justify the damage to Indians through loss of control of their
children's education in the Wind River case?
Secondly, the Wyoming School Code, in the provisions cited
above,62 is patently unconstitutional if recent judicial theories about
school finances and equal protection are applied.68 For the code
provides for equalized school district valuations-and hence in-
comes-only within counties, not statewide.
The Wyoming Reorganization Law appears presently susceptible
to judicial scrutiny. This conclusion becomes even more compelling
when the present composition of the United States Supreme Court
and the philosophies of its members are taken into account. Re-
cently the four Nixon appointees to the Court united in a pair of
58. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Most constitutional litigation involves
balancing the rights and interests of the litigants.
59. Chapter 6, § 21.1-109(a), Wyo. Stat. (1957).
60. Chapter 6, § 21.1-109(3), Wyo. Stat. (1957).
61. See I. ILLIcH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1971) ; C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM
(1970).
62. Chapter 6, § 21.1-109(a), (e), Wyo. Stat. (1957).
63. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). [On
March 22, 1973, by a 5 to 4 vote, the United States Supreme Court decided San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 41 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Mar. 22, 1973), which
will affect this argument. However, this issue was at press and it was therefore impos-
sible to have the author rewrite the section above. (Editor)].
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cases dealing with redistricting of local school districts in the South.'
All four took a very strong position in favor of local control of
schools.
65
The first of the two cases, Wright,6 dealt with the constitution-
ality of a Virginia city's withdrawal from a county-wide school
system in the midst of an on-going school desegregation law suit.
The court's majority concluded that the city's action, coming as
it did just two weeks after a federal district court judge ordered
a new county-wide desegregation plan into effect, was simply a
subterfuge to further delay the implementation of the plan.
6 7
But the President's appointees, Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist, with Chief Justice Burger, disagreed. Under the previous
arrangement, the City of Emporia had concluded a contract for
the education of its children with the county school board. In ex-
change for an annual sum, the county agreed to educate the city's
children. However, the plan failed to provide the city a share
in control of the schools. The city now wanted to break away from
the county's schools in order to reestablish control of the education
of its children. The Court's majority saw the merit in this goal
but believed in context that it simply was not good .enough to over-
come the strong evidence that the city was acting merely to avoid
integration. Nevertheless, it voiced a forthright defense of local
control.
A more weighty consideration put forth by Emporia is
its lack of formal control over the school system under the
terms of the contract with the county ...
We do not underestimate the deficiencies, from Em-
poria's standpoint, in the arrangement by which it undertook
in 1968 to provide for the education of its children. Direct
control over the decisions vitally affecting the education of
one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society,
and since 1967 the citizens of Emporia have had little of
that control.68
The Court, however, in ruling against the city made a distinction
between formal and actual control or influence. It is of particular
significance that the majority denied Emporia's claim because the
city displayed "obvious leadership ability" which would make itself
felt in informal ways within the county system, thus mitigating
64. Wright v. City of Emporia, 4.07 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
65. Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (Burger, C. J., and Blackman,
Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ; United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ.,
407 U.S. 484 (1972) (Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, & Rehnquist, M3., concurring).
66. Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 468-69.
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the effects of lack of formal control. 9 That is precisely what
is not present among Indians in Fremont County when it comes
to influencing white-dominated power structures. The Wind River
Reservation needs a separate school district because it has been
repeatedly overwhelmed by the aggressive and voluble whites of
Fremont County.
The Burger-led minority disagreed that this informal ability
to influence the county system was relevant in meeting the over-
riding need for local school control:
This limitation on the discretion of the district courts involves
more than polite deference to the role of local governments.
Local control is not only vital to continuing public support
of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an
educational standpoint as well.70
The other distinction between Wright and the Fremont situation,
aside from the lack of "obvious leadership ability" in relation
to whites, is the absence of the segregation issue. Wyoming has
never had a racially segregated school system.7 1
In Wright's companion case, United States v. Scotland Neck
Board of Education7 2 the Nixon appointees sided with the majority,
though in a separate opinion, holding that an action of the North
Carolina Legislature creating a new school district, predominantly
white, out of territory also subject to a desegregation order was
invalid. In that circumstance the Burger-led concurrence found the
new, separate school district, unlike Emporia (or the reservation),
was a manufactured entity in no way deserving of a separate
governmental status. The redistricting also stood to impede desegre-
gation much more decisively and directly than in the Wright
case.
73
In other words, to the four new members of the Court, local
control is a valid, if not overriding, factor for identifiable commu-
nities, such as Wind River-a federally created, treaty reservation
granted its own government under the laws of Congress.7 4
The point is: Based on their expressions in these two cases,
both of which concerned on-going desegregation law suits and efforts
to circumvent them (factors not present in the Fremont County
circumstance), it is clear that at least four of the nine justices
69. Id. at 469.
70. Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
71. WYo. CONST. art, VII, § 10: "No Discrimination Between Pupils--In none of the
public schools so established and maintained shall distinctions be made on account of
sex, race or color."
72. U.S. v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
73. Id.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
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are deeply committed to local control. They view it as both a
democratic and educational necessity. The other five also lean in
favor of local control provided it is not used to thwart the purposes
or defeat the jurisdiction of federal courts actively engaged in re-
forming unconstitutional practices stemming from de jure segrega-
tion.
It is arguable that under the circumstances of the Wind River
Reservation the four Nixon appointees could unite with a majority
of the Court to find that Wyoming's interest in consolidating Fremont
County's school districts with the reservation is not as great as
the Indians' interest in retaining control of those elementary schools.
Additionally, aside from the Indian interest in educational self-de-
termination, there are also present questions of the unsubstantiality
of "efficient administrative units" as a basis for school district
consolidation and the continued prospect of statewide disparities
in school district finances even after reorganization, a factor already
recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court.7 5
2. FREE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION APPLIED
Three sweeping principles are now established law in this coun-
try:
1. Parents have the right to bring up their children.78
2. States may not compel children to attend public school if
they are being given an adequate education privately."
3. States may not compel the attendance of children in organ-
ized school programs when to do so seriously compromises and
threatens the religious beliefs of their parents and their community
life.78
These principles indicate that the Supreme Court recognizes
a compelling interest in preserving individual freedom in the sphere
of education.
It is but a logical step to a fourth proposition:
4. States must provide mechanisms for ensuring that religious
and other First Amendment rights of parents are provided for
within the public school system when no other means for protecting
those rights exist.
This means that if people such as the Amish demonstrate their
sincere religious conviction that public school education deprives
them of religious freedom but, unlike the Amish, are unwilling to
75. Sweetwater Co. Plan Com. for Org. of Sh. D. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1237
(1971).
76. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
77. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
78. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. Z05 (1972).
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withdraw from the educational system and unable to finance their
own schools, then the state must provide resources for them to
educate their children as they see fit.
To the extent that the state's own educational system imposes
a foreign ideology upon the minority and this imposition approaches
religious significance, the state must provide means for protecting
diversity. Before justifying this statement in detail, it would be
helpful to first examine the Yoder decision.
Yoder involved appeals of criminal convictions for violations
of compulsory school attendance laws in Wisconsin. Several mem-
bers of religious groups called the Old Order Amish and Conserva-
tive Amish Mennonite Church withheld their children from public
schools beyond the eighth grade. They claimed that further public
education would seriously violate tenets of their religion having
to do with keeping themselves separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed their
convictions79 and the Supreme Court affirmed.80 The Court's decision
was unanimous, only Justice Douglas offering a partial dissent.
81
In many ways, Yoder is one of the most remarkable of recent
Supreme Court decisions. For perhaps the first time the Court
recognized the vast influence of public schools in inculcating habits
of thought, values, life styles and ideologies in children and con-
ceded that these may have religious overtones.
As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs
of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with
the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish reli-
gion; modern laws requiring compulsory secondary educa-
tion have accordingly engendered great concern and conflict.
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by
exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of
attitudes, goals and values contrary to beliefs, and by sub-
stantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent state of
development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and prac-
tice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child. 82
The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly
success, and social life with other students. Amish society
emphasizes informal learning-through doing, a life of
'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect, wisdom, rather
than technical knowledge, community welfare rather than
79. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
80. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
81. Id. at 241.
82. Id. at 217-18.
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competition, and separation, rather than integration with
contemporary worldly society.8
3
Thus, a state's interest in universal education, however
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on other fundamental rights and interests,
such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, 'prepare
[them] for additional obligations.'8 4
As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age
16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice
as it exists today; They must either abandon belief and be
assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate
to some other and more tolerant region.8 5
This is the closest the Court has come to enunciating an inalienable
right to be different.
The situation of Indians with regard to public education under
white-dominated school administrations is essentially identical to
the Amish, except perhaps that Indians have suffered even more
than the Amish from the intolerances and subtle impositions of
alien values and beliefs. Indian community life has already been
seriously disrupted and, in the case of the Wind River Reservation,
threatens to be even more disrupted if the present administration
of the three elementary schools is altered.
Only two points distinguish the Wind River Arapahoes and
Shoshones from the Amish: The Indian claim to special treatment
because of religion is less well-documented, and Indians do not wish
to be separated entirely from the larger society-they merely
want to blend the skills and resources of the outer world with
their own cultures and traditions. For reasons which will be explained
below these distinctions are not significant and the Wind River
Indian people's right to be different should be recognized equally
with that of the Amish.
The religious bona fides of the Wind River Indian people are
established. Their religious beliefs predate even the 200 year Amish
tradition which the Court made so much of in Yoder. 8 True, the
Arapahoes and Shoshones to an even greater extent appear to have
lost much of their unique heritage.8 7 However this is only a surface
83. Id. at 211.
84. Id. at 214.
85. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 209-13, 218-19 235-36.
87. More so than many tribes of the Southwest such as the Navajos, Apaches and
Pueblos who retain a vigorous ceremQniI life as well as their own language.
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impression. It can be shown that the majority of Arapahoes and a
significant percentage of Shoshones (historically Shoshones became
more acculturated than Arapahoes) retain their religious and cul-
tural traditions from ancient times. The annual sundances of both
tribes are indications of the vitality of these beliefs.
These ancient religious beliefs are completely bound up with the
life styles of these people. As a result, this circumstance satisfies
the other element of the Yoder ruling-that the religious beliefs must
be inseparable from the community's life style. Indians have been
dominated by whites, and their religious heritage forced under-
ground, to such an extent that this point may not be clear. But the
statement is essentially valid and can be authenticated in court
through the testimony of medicine men, expert witnesses from out-
side the communities, and by Indian lay people themselves.
Of course Yoder is not on all fours with the Indian situation.
For one thing, Yoder was a criminal case where stricter standards
naturally applied to govern state action (although the Court realized
that the issues concerned the welfare and continued existence of
the whole Amish community and not just the five dollar fines
which had been imposed). For another, the Amish merely wanted
to be left alone. They were satisfied to be able to keep their children
home after the eighth grade. They demanded nothing of the state.
The Indians do demand state action. They are not retreating from
the outside world. They want to rectify a tragically incompetent
educational system which has threatened to destroy them. And
they think they can do this best by assuming control of that system.
Therefore, they want the state to continue to finance an educational
program for their children on their terms.
In light of some recent lower court decisions and one Supreme
Court case 8 it is imperative that the Indians' point be fully under-
stood. They are not demanding the right to instruct their children
in religion at state expense or to entangle the state in an incestuous
relationship with parochial education. Rather, they seek state
acknowledgement of the brutal and undeniable religious impact of
the present educational system, controlled by non-Indians, upon
them-a system of white values, customs and world views which
clashes with their own. They seek escape from the white culture
of the white-dominated classroom. They maintain that to escape
from that culture does not require substitution of Indian religion
in the classroom; it merely requires the removal of the Anglo,
middle-class aura. Hence there is no real problem of religious
88. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ; Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th
Cir. 1972) ; Brusca v. Missouri ex. rel. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo.
1971). For an interpretation of Yoder that considers it an anti-integration case, &e6
Berns, Ratiocinations, HARPERS, March, 1973, at 36-44.
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establishment. A separate school is instead the only remedy for
a circumstance becoming increasingly pronounced-that the public
schools themselves impose religious views on children.9 Wind River
people want no more than to protect their prerogatives in the three
elementary schools and extend their control to secondary education
for their children-to add Indian history courses, to hire qualified
Indian teachers who know and understand the children, to teach
Arapahoe and Shoshone languages.
In effect, the Indians are saying: Your values and culture
pervade the public schools which you control, and their merciless
imposition on our children is harmful to them. Our children are
made to feel inferior. They are made to question their parents'
beliefs. You have failed to educate them properly. Let us have the
power, as you have it, to infuse our schools with our values and
culture so that there will be harmony between home and school.
The proven failure of white-controlled schools for Indians, coupled
with the special status of Indians under federal law, makes the
Indian claim for separate schools (in terms of control, not enroll-
ments) even more compelling than the Amish claim for special
treatment.
The point is that ideas about public education and its role in
society are changing. 90 The Supreme Court's actions and other
events show that public education is becoming less monolithic,
though no less important. The claim that education is the sole
panacea for society's ills, however, is being questioned. The follow-
ing points represent a significant attitudinal change toward public
education:
1. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized the
merit and viability of local educational control;
2. The entire Court has recognized the Amish claim to a reli-
gious exemption from compulsory school attendance and thereby
reaffirmed its conviction that no state may impose homogeneity
upon its citizens;
3. School finance cases are being decided which are likely
to have a revolutionary effect on the structure of the public school
system; 91
4. A movement is on to make education more responsive through
89. At schools on Indian reservations teachers especially often carry on the work of
early missionaries. At Ramah, New Mexico, for examnle, teachers In a white-dominated
elementary school with a majority of Navajo pupils have been repeatedly reported to
be Instructing children in Christian religion.
90. I. ILLica, DEscnOoLING SoCIETY (1971); Hodgson, Do Schools Make A Difference?
T m ATLANTIC, March 1973.
91. See A Better Way to Pav for Sohools, FoETuNv, Feb. 1978, at 112-20.
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competition: voucher plans, performance contracts, "alternative-
free schools," etc.
5. The President is on record as favoring state aid to parochial
schools in order to protect educational diversity.
Indians now demand recognition that they are unique and have
special needs and therefore rights. There is every reason to believe
that their views would be treated favorably by the Supreme Court.
3. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OF INDIANS TO THE UNITED STATES
If none of the preceding arguments singly or together are con-
sidered persuasive, then certainly the existence of a continuing
federal responsibility for the education and welfare of Indians es-
tablishes their right to federal action compelling states to recognize
the reservation entities in drawing school district lines. If the federal
government does not compel the states to act, then it should estab-
lish and finance federally-funded school systems on reservations
itself.
Under the United States Constitution, commerce with Indian
tribes is made the responsibility solely of Congress. 92 The United
States has power to control and manage the affairs of Indians,
as wards, in good faith and for their welfare. 93 It has been said that:
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes,
the Government is something more than a mere contracting
party. Under a humane and self imposed [sic] policy which
has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous
decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obli-
gations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct,
as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings
with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards. 94
The relationship has been compared to that of guardian and
ward: 9 5
From their (the Indians') very weakness and helplessness,
so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Govern-
ment with them and the treaties in which it was promised,
there arises the duty of protection and with it the power. 6
Congress has placed plenary authority in the Secretary of the
Interior to provide for the education of Indians.97
92. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, el. 3.
93. United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959).
94. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
95. Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
96. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1896).
97. Snyder Act. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) ; Johnson-O'Malley Act, Act of Apr. 16, 1934,
ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1970).
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From these pronouncements it follows that the Johnson O'Malley
Act and contracts under it, which precipitated the transfer of im-
mediate educational responsibility from the Secretary of the Interior
to the states, does not in any way divest the United States of its
continuing, overriding, fiduciary obligations to ensure that the edu-
cation Indians receive in public schools is the best possible."8 It
must enforce its contracts with states in such a way as to fulfill
its guardianship duties to Indians. 9
It may also be true that states themselves in accepting federal
money to educate Indians'00 become the agents of the federal govern-
ment in carrying out the fiduciary obligations of the United States
with respect to Indians. Alternatively, each contract between the
United States and the various states for the education of Indians
creates third party beneficiary rights in Indians which can be
enforced.1 0'
Either way, focusing on the federal government's duties or
those of the states as agents of the United States, the best interests
of Indians are paramount in developing educational systems for them.
The preceding discussion has disclosed that local control of
education by Indian communities is in their best interest. Thus, it
is incumbent upon the federal government, as well as the states,
to ensure the creation of political subdivisions or other effective
mechanisms that will give Indians the kind of participation
and involvement in the education of their children which they so
desperately need and want.
Both the Senate Subcommittee and the President recognize this
need:
One of the saddest aspects of Indian life in the United States
is the low quality of Indian education. Drop-out rates for
Indians are twice the national average and the average edu-
cational level for all Indians under Federal supervision is
less than six school years. Again, at least a part of the prob-
lem stems from the fact that the Federal government is
trying to do for Indians what many Indians could better do
for themselves.
The Federal government now has responsibility for some
221,000 Indian children of school age...
Consistent with our policy that the Indian community should
98. The United States' continuing responsibility for the education of Indians is under-
scored by the fact that states exercise jurisdiction to enforce school laws on Indian
reservations only with consent of the tribes, See 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
99. See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
100. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, AN EVEN CHANCE (1971) describes
the extent and nature of the assistance and its misuses [hereinafter cited as AN EVEN
CHANCE].
101. See generally 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772-855 (1951, SupP. 1971).
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have the right to take over the control and operation of fed-
erally funded programs, we believe every Indian community
wishing to do so should be able to control its own Indians
schools . . .102
The federal courts have broadly construed the federal govern-
ment's fiduciary duties to Indians, and consequently they have re-
quired the federal government to exercise its obligations to the
fullest in the best interests of Indians. 10 3 There is every reason to
believe that they would respond accordingly with regard to education;
that they would recognize the motives (money and assimilation)
of the federal government in turning over Indian education to the
states and would pierce the veil of state rather than federal involve-
ment to find a continuing federal responsibility to insure the highest
quality of education for Indians. 0 4
III. CONCLUSION
If the above arguments do nothing else, they establish the point
that Indians are different, unique, distinct, and that for these reasons
the "neutral" application of state laws to them is indeed a discrim-
ination. As the Court said in Yoder:
Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wis-
consin's requirement for school attendance to age 16 applies
uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face,
discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or that
it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. 105
Because Indian needs and desires are different, the courts must
102. President Richard M. Nixon's Message to Congress, July 8, 1970, 116 CONG. REc.
23131 (1970).
There is some question whether the President's use of the word community
meant local Indian communities as distinguished from tribal governments.
A telegram sent by the President to the Ramah Navajo School Board on
September 11, 1970, seems to clear up this point:
This is a welcome opportunity to send greetings to the Ramah
Navajo School Board and express my hope for the success of
your community school. The establishment of this school as
the first Indian controlled junior-senior high school in the
country represents an important new direction in Indian edu-
cation which my administration will actively encourage. As I
said in my July 9 [sic] message to Congress, I firmly adhere
to the principle that every Indian community wishing to do so
should be able to control its own Indian schools. The time has
come to extend local Indian control in many fields-At a rate
and to the degree that the Indians themselves establish. I am
pleased to see this example to [sic] Indian control In operation,
and I wish you every success in your endeavor.
103. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
104. See Rosenfelt, supra note 6 for a thorough discussion of the special status of Ir-
dians under federal law.
105. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
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ensure that states, as well as the federal government, defer to them.
Existing case law from Brown v. Board of Education'" through
Yoder'0 7 serves as a sufficient basis for claiming an independent
Indian right to control their own education. Such a conclusion neces-
sarily follows from the nature of the discrimination practiced against
Indians. That discrimination is unique, differing totally from the
discrimination practiced against blacks-although its consequences
in terms of poverty, poor education, poor health and political pow-
erlessness are similar to that suffered by all victims of racial
or ethnic prejudice and discrimination. And so, just as the form
of discrimination against Indians is different, so too must be the
remedies. In the case of education, that means creation of mechan-
isms to ensure that Indians will control their children's education.
Most of the great victories in Indian education, those which
are making or will make a difference in the lives of ordinary
people, have been won through diplomacy, not law suits, a diplomacy
springing from and associated with community organizing. Rough
Rock, Ramah, and Wind River are examples of the power of persua-
sion, coupled with the judicious use of grassroots public relations, as
a means for taking over control.
Diplomacy is often a lonely, quiet struggle. It sometimes takes
a long time. But its rewards, when they come, are infinitely more
valuable than a piece of paper signed by a judge telling an Indian-
controlled school board not to discriminate against Indians.
In Wyoming, for example, it appears no test case to put the
legal arguments of this article before a court will come about after
all. The Wind River Indian Education Association, created and con-
trolled by Indians on the reservation, is coming to the end of a three
year effort to have a separate school district created on the reser-
vation. On November 20, 1972, in a formal notice to the Fremont
County School Planning Committee, the State Board of Education
of Wyoming, sitting as the State Committee for School District Or-
ganization wrote:
1. It is recommended that the Fremont County School Plan-
ning Committee consider a plan of organization which re-
organizes Fremont County into three (3) unified school dis-
tricts. Said plan must provide a secondary school on the res-
ervation, designed to meet the needs of the Indian children.
All Indian children should be given the opportunity of attend-
ing the secondary school of their choice, with all tuition
being borne by the school district in which they reside.
106. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10-7. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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2. It is further recommended that the Indian people have
control over the operation and management of the educa-
tional program for Indian children.
3. The State Committee on School District Organization re-
iterates its direction that the County Committee document
the special educational needs of Indian children and how
they will be provided for.108
On March 2, 1973 the State Committee unanimously adopted a
resolution creating a school district coterminous with the area popu-
lated by Indians, the first time that any state board of education has
ever done so.
108. Rejection Notice, Re: Fremont County Plan of Organization, Submitted to the
State Committee on November 11, 1972 and taken under advisement on that date.
State Committee for School District Organizalon, November 20, 1972.

